Artikler, rapporter og annet (Handelshøgskolen)

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Artikler, rapporter og annet (Handelshøgskolen)

The collection contains 46 document(s)

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• The moderator effects of perceived risk, objective knowledge and certainty in the satisfaction–loyalty relationship

  Tuu, Huy Ho; Olsen, Svein Ottar; Linh, Pham Thi Thuy (Journal article; Tidsskriftartikkel; Peer reviewed, 2011)

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  Description:	This is the accepted manuscript version of the article. Published version: Journal of Consumer Marketing, 28/5 (2011) 363–375, available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/07363761111150017 This article is part of Ho Huy Tuu's doctoral thesis and is available in Munin at http://hdl.handle.net/10037/2971
  URI:	http://hdl.handle.net/10037/3635

  File(s) in this item: 1

  article.pdf   (190.2Kb)
• Minimum Quality Standards and Novelty Requirements in a One-Short Development Race

  Rockett, Katharine E; Prokop, Jacek; Regibeau, Pierre (Journal article; Tidsskriftartikkel; Peer reviewed, 2010)

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  URI:	http://hdl.handle.net/10037/3094

  File(s) in this item: 1

  article.pdf   (449.7Kb)
• Endogenous technology sharing in r&d intensive industries

  Sand, Jan Yngve; Clark, Derek John (Journal article; Tidsskriftartikkel; Peer reviewed, 11-Jan-2010)

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  Abstract:

  This paper analyses endogenous formation of technology sharing coalitions with asymmetric firms. Coalition partners produce complementary technology advancements, although firms do not co-operate on R&D investment level or in the product market. The equilibrium coalition outcome is either between the two most efficient firms, or a coalition with all three firms. The two-firm coalition is the preferred outcome of a welfare maximising authority if ex ante marginal cost is sufficiently high, and the three-firm coalition is preferred otherwise. Furthermore, we show that the equilibrium outcomes result in the lowest total R&D investment of all possible outcomes. Aircraft engine manufacturing provides a case study, and indicates the importance of antitrust issues as an addition to the theory.

  URI:

  http://hdl.handle.net/10037/2501

  File(s) in this item: 1

  article.pdf   (603.5Kb)
• Simultaneous versus sequential offers in dominant player bargaining

  Clark, Derek J.; Pereau, Jean Christophe (Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 10-Jan-2008)

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  Abstract:	We consider bargaining between a number of players that are all essential in creating a surplus. One of the players is dominant in the sense that it ultimately decides whether the surplus will be created. The other players have an incentive to get a large share of the pie for themselves, but leaving enough for the dominant firm that it finds it profitable to create the surplus. Hence, the smaller players have preferences over who they take their share from. When the dominant player makes the first offer in an alternating offer framework, we analyse whether it should conduct negotiations sequentially with some grouping of players, or simultaneously. We demonstrate that the dominant player will prefer simultaneous negotiation. The other players would prefer to negotiate early with the dominant one, and then to see remaining rivals negotiate simultaneously.
  Description:	This paper is part of the project "The knowledge-based society"
  URI:	http://hdl.handle.net/10037/1815

  File(s) in this item: 1

  article.pdf   (197.4Kb)
• Merger and bilateral bargaining : A note

  Musy, Olivier; Clark, Derek J.; Pereau, Jean Christophe (Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 05-Feb-2008)

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  Abstract:

  In a context of bilateral bargaining between an upstream supplier and several downstream buyers, this note determines the conditions under which two buyers have an incentive to merge depending on whether (i) the bargaining process is simultaneous or sequential and (ii) the post merger buyer becomes pivotal or not. We also determine conditions under which the players will prefer to bargain simultaneously or in sequence.

  URI:

  http://hdl.handle.net/10037/1814

  File(s) in this item: 1

  article.pdf   (166.0Kb)

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