http://hdl.handle.net/10037/621 2012-02-12T06:26:11Z http://hdl.handle.net/10037/3635 Tuu, Huy Ho; Olsen, Svein Ottar; Linh, Pham Thi Thuy<br /> This is the accepted manuscript version of the article. Published version: Journal of Consumer Marketing, 28/5 (2011) 363–375, available at <a href=http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/07363761111150017>http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/07363761111150017</a> <br/>This article is part of Ho Huy Tuu's doctoral thesis and is available in Munin at <a href=http://hdl.handle.net/10037/2971>http://hdl.handle.net/10037/2971</a><br /> 2010-12-31T23:00:00Z Tuu, Huy Ho Olsen, Svein Ottar Linh, Pham Thi Thuy http://hdl.handle.net/10037/3094 Rockett, Katharine E; Prokop, Jacek; Regibeau, Pierre<br /> 2009-12-31T23:00:00Z Rockett, Katharine E Prokop, Jacek Regibeau, Pierre http://hdl.handle.net/10037/2501 Sand, Jan Yngve; Clark, Derek John<br /> This paper analyses endogenous formation of technology sharing coalitions with asymmetric firms. Coalition partners produce complementary technology advancements, although firms do not co-operate on R&D investment level or in the product market. The equilibrium coalition outcome is either between the two most efficient firms, or a coalition with all three firms. The two-firm coalition is the preferred outcome of a welfare maximising authority if ex ante marginal cost is sufficiently high, and the three-firm coalition is preferred otherwise. Furthermore, we show that the equilibrium outcomes result in the lowest total R&D investment of all possible outcomes. Aircraft engine manufacturing provides a case study, and indicates the importance of antitrust issues as an addition to the theory.<br /> 2010-01-10T23:00:00Z Sand, Jan Yngve Clark, Derek John http://hdl.handle.net/10037/1815 Clark, Derek J.; Pereau, Jean Christophe<br /> We consider bargaining between a number of players that are all essential in creating a surplus. One of the players is dominant in the sense that it ultimately decides whether the surplus will be created. The other players have an incentive to get a large share of the pie for themselves, but leaving enough for the dominant firm that it finds it profitable to create the surplus. Hence, the smaller players have preferences over who they take their share from. When the dominant player makes the first offer in an alternating offer framework, we analyse whether it should conduct negotiations sequentially with some grouping of players, or simultaneously. We demonstrate that the dominant player will prefer simultaneous negotiation. The other players would prefer to negotiate early with the dominant one, and then to see remaining rivals negotiate simultaneously.<br /> This paper is part of the project "The knowledge-based society"<br /> 2008-01-09T23:00:00Z Clark, Derek J. Pereau, Jean Christophe http://hdl.handle.net/10037/1814 Musy, Olivier; Clark, Derek J.; Pereau, Jean Christophe<br /> In a context of bilateral bargaining between an upstream supplier and several downstream buyers, this note determines the conditions under which two buyers have an incentive to merge depending on whether (i) the bargaining process is simultaneous or sequential and (ii) the post merger buyer becomes pivotal or not. We also determine conditions under which the players will prefer to bargain simultaneously or in sequence.<br /> 2008-02-04T23:00:00Z Musy, Olivier Clark, Derek J. Pereau, Jean Christophe http://hdl.handle.net/10037/1813 Østbye, Stein<br /> The paper presents a simple three-region, two-sector general equilibrium model that is used for analysing the effect of regional tax policies. The model includes exogenous asymmetry in terms of transport costs as well as a vertical industry structure that can account for endogenous location development in order to distinguish between the effect of ‘first nature’ and ‘second nature’ on the required subsidy for meeting a population policy target.<br /> A first version of this paper was presented at the 47th annual WRSA meeting and a seminar at Western Washington University in February 2008.<br /> 2008-02-29T23:00:00Z Østbye, Stein http://hdl.handle.net/10037/1812 Kahui, Viktoria; Armstrong, Claire W.<br /> This paper applies a bioeconomic model in order to study different interactions between a harvested renewable resource and a non-renewable resource without commercial value that is negatively affected by the harvesting activity. This enables the analysis of for instance cold water coral habitats and their importance to commercial fish species. The fish is harvested either in a manner that does not damage coral, such as stationary gear, or in a destructive fashion, such as bottom trawling. We find that when coral is a preferred or essential habitat, the optimal steady-state fish stock is no longer independent of the habitat level, i.e. optimum optimorum values determine the optimal stationary gear harvest rate and how much habitat should optimally be preserved. Such optimum optimorum values will vary according to the type of habitat-fishery connection, and some bottom trawling may be optimal for some periods of time. Our findings extend upon the underlying assumption of a constant habitat quality of bioeconomic models when destructive fishing methods are involved and a habitat-fishery connection exists.<br /> 2008-10-31T23:00:00Z Kahui, Viktoria Armstrong, Claire W. http://hdl.handle.net/10037/1811 Clark, Derek J.; Michalsen, Anita<br /> This paper studies how a separation of ownership and management affects a firm’s incentives to transfer knowledge about technology to a rival in a Cournot duopoly. We consider a three-stage strategic delegation game, where there are two technologies available; one with increasing returns to scale and the other with constant returns to scale. Whilst the former is known to both firms, only the more advanced firm has initially access to the latter type of technology. This firm is assumed to be managerial, not only with respect to product market decisions, but also regarding the choice of whether or not to transfer technology to the rival firm. We show that strategic management will not necessarily affect the decision to transfer technology to a rival, but we identify conditions under which it changes the technology choice of the managerial firm. Welfare implications of this are considered.<br /> 2008-03-26T23:00:00Z Clark, Derek J. Michalsen, Anita http://hdl.handle.net/10037/1810 Armstrong, Claire W.; Kahui, Viktoria; Aanesen, Margrethe<br /> I sommer har konflikten om havområdene utenfor Lofoten-Vesterålen toppet seg, med sterke utspill fra fiskerhold om seismikkskyting på fiskefelt. Økende bruk av havet til ulike aktiviteter, det være seg fiske eller petroleumsvirksomhet, oppdrett, transport eller turisme, gjør at en bredere forståelse av hvilke verdier havet tilbyr er et viktig innspill i politiske avgjørelser. I dette arbeidet presenteres og kvantifiseres økonomiske verdier generert i territorialfarvannet utenfor Nordland fylke ved bruk av Total Economic Value (TEV) oppsettet. Studien viser at verdier vi vanligvis forbinder med havet, slik som fiske og turisme, kun utgjør en begrenset andel av de totale verdiene som havmiljøet tilbyr.<br /> Dette er en omarbeidet versjon av utredningen Økonomisk verdsetting av havmiljø – Anvendelse på havområdene i Lofoten-Vesterålen gjort på oppdrag for Miljøverndepartementet i 2007-2008.<br /> 2008-09-30T22:00:00Z Armstrong, Claire W. Kahui, Viktoria Aanesen, Margrethe http://hdl.handle.net/10037/1809 Aanesen, Margrethe<br /> Models of sequential bargaining under asymmetric information often exhibit equilibria which are characterised by the fact that agreement is reached only with a delay and that the final (period) solution is ex ante inefficient. The latter means that agreement is not reached though it is efficient (aggregate pay off exceeds aggregate costs). In this paper we analyse how intervention by a third agent in a sequential bargaining process, modelled as a durable goods monopoly, affects the (high path) equilibrium outcome. The effects of intervention crucially depend on how intervention is formulated. When the intervening agent and the seller decides the price and the subsidy (the intervening agent’s contribution) is decided in a Stackelberg game with the intervening agent as the leader the negotiations are always speeded up and equilibrium inefficiency reduced. When the seller acts as a Stackelberg leader the negotiations are only conditionally speeded up and the equilibrium inefficiency only conditionally reduced. For the same values on the reservation prices and discount factor intervention is more likely to take place when the seller acts as a Stackelberg leader. Also, both the seller’s price and the subsidy are higher when the seller acts as a Stackelberg leader compared to if the intervening agent acts as a Stackelberg leader.<br /> 2008-09-30T22:00:00Z Aanesen, Margrethe